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A SIMPLE PROOF THAT FUTURES MARKETS AREALMOSTALWAYS
INFORMATIONALLY INEFFICIENT
ABSTRACT
Previous work which showed that prices could aggregate perfectly the
diverse information of traders depended critically on the assumption that all
agents had constant absolute risk utility. We show that either all agents must
have constant absolute risk aversion utility, or all must have constant
relative aversion in order for the strong form of the efficient market
hypothesis to hold generically.
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The notion that stock markets, commodity markets, and futures
markets are informationally efficient Is widely—accepted. When
different traders have disparate information, it is clear that a
single price cannot reveal the information of of the
participants; but It Is still possible that markets can aggregate
this information, and that prices can reveal all of the relevant
information.(More precisely, prices can be sufficient
statistics. For example, knowing the futures price, one may be
able to make as good a forecast of the spot price as one could
make knowing the futures price and all of the other information
of the various market participants.
In an earlier paper, Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) constructed
a Simple model of a futures market that was informationally
efficient.In their model, there was a large number of farmers,
each of whom had perfect information about his own crop (but no
direct information about the crops of others). The equilibrium
price on the futures market aggregated this disparate information
perfectly, and hence the futures price was a sufficient statistic
for predicting the spot price.
The Grossman—Stlglitz model had several special properties.
Chief among them was the assumption that all producers had the
same constant absolute risk aversion utility function. This meant
that the aggregate supply of futures only depended on the estimate
of aggregate output:the distribution of output across farmershad no effect on the aggregate supply of futures, and hence it had
no effect on the equilibrium futures price.
In general, one might expect that the distribution of crops
across producers would affect the supply of futures. For
Instance, the supply of futures might be high because all farmers
know that they are going to have a large crop, and want to divest
themselves of the associated price risk; or it may be that the
aggregate crop is small, but with a larger dispersion of crop
sizes.In this latter case, it may be that farmers with small
outputs are more risk averse, and take a more hedged position,
which outweighs the reduction in hedging by the farmers with large
crops, who are less risk averse.
The general observation Is that the price on the futures
market is a function of the aggregate level of output and the
dispersion of crop sizes across farmers. The fact that the
futures market is not efficient generically In the model here
indicates that the futures price cannot be fully revealing in
1,2,3
general.
This paper determines necessary and sufficient conditions for
prices on futures markets to be sufficient statistics for spot
market prices.4 We employ a simple model of trade on a futures
market to show that there are only two classes of utility
functions for which markets are efficient In general: constant
absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion. The
restrictions to these two families is important because of the
structure of market demand that they generate.
structureof paper. The remainder of the paper is
divided Into three sections. In the first, we set up the basic
2model.In the second, we consider the case of cxanteidentical
farmers.It is shown there that the only utility functions for
which futures prices are sufficient statistics are those for which
the risk tolerance function is linear in wealth.If prices are to
be sufficient statistics in more general models, the utility
functions must belong to this class.
In the subsequent section. we extend the model by allowing
for heterogeneity among farmers. We show that while the constant
absolute risk aversion utility function still works, the constant
relative risk aversion utility function no longer gives the
efficiency result when farmers differ in their respective
coefficients of relative risk aversion.
2.The Model
There are m farmers indexed by i =1,2 m. The farmers
are risk—averse von Neumann—Morgenstern expected utility of wealth
maximizers. There is no motive for pure speculation, so only
farmers trade on the futures market. At time t0, each farmer
sees his crop, q1. At t=l, a round of trading takes place on the
futures market, allowing the farmers to insure themselves by
buying or selling claims on the commodity. At time t2, the spot
market opens.
Assume that spot market demand is linear:
p =a-bQ+6.
is the spot price, is a demand shock, and Q =
q1
is
the total crop.Farmers are price takers, and there is no storage
technology here, so the entire crop will be sold on the spot
market.
3There is a competitive rational expectations equilibr-iwn In
the futures market. This requires first that the futures market
clears at t1:
ilxi =0.
Equilibrium also requires that farmer i selects his supply x. to
maximize expected utility, conditional on Pf and q.:
x.=argsaxE[U(pfx+P5(q1_xfllpf,q.].
In sum, plans are optimal with decisions conditioned on the
equilibrium futures prices Pf and one's own output.5
3. CondItions on Preferences
We proceed first by getting conditions on utility that are
necessary for the futures market to be efficient. The spot price
depends on individual crop sizes only through total supply Q.
For Pf to be fully revealing, it must depend on Q alone, and not
on the individual values. In other words, Pf must be invariant
to the division of Q among the farmers. An implication is:
Theorem 1:In the one—period model, a necessary and
sufficient condition for efficiency on the futures market, when
farmers have identical utility, is that utility be of the linear
risk tolerance class:
U' (W)/U" (W) =a+bW.
Proof: The proof is in Appendix A.
The method of proof Is to show that, In order for the futures
price to be fully revealing, the supply of futures must be a
linear function of the farmer's output. An implication is that
the utility function must come from the linear risk tolerance
4(hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) class.
The class of linear risk tolerance utility functions can be
divided into two subclasses The analysis that follows will focus
on the following representative members of the linear risk
tolerance class:
1. constant absolute risk aversion (cara): U(W) =
2.constant relative risk version (crra): U(W) =
Theentire linear risk tolerance family Is composed of affine
transformations of the two representative utility functions (and
also U(W)log(+W)). For example, functions of the form U(W) =
— are members. Note also that the class labelled
"constant relative risk aversion' represents a broadening of that
class to include utility functions that exhibit constant relative
risk aversion with respect to a translated origin.
The necessity of linear supply curves for fitures is
intuitive. Suppose that endowments are altered 5lightly so that
one trader's crop rises while another's drops by the same amount.
For instance, let q1 become q1i, and let q2 become q2—A. Since
the aggregate output is not altered by this transfer, the net
quantity supplied at the price Pf must not change if the price is
to be fully revealing of Q.In particular, the one farmer's
increased supply must just be matched by the other farmer's
decreased supply.In order for this neutrality result to hold for
all pairs of farmers and all transfers, each farmer must have a
supply curve with the same constant slope.
The following section examines the extent to which the
results generalize to cases where individuals have different
utility functions.
54.DifferenceS jfl B.iJiAversion
We now ask what happens when farmers have utility functions
within the same class, but with different parameter values. Since
our interest is in determining those utility functions for which
the futures market is always efficient, It Is sufficient to
examine linear risk tolerance utility functions only. We show:
Theorem 2:Prices are fully revealing if and only if all
farmers have constant absolute risk aversion utility, or all
farmers have constant relative risk aversion utility, with the
same coefficient of relative risk aversion for each farmer.
Proof: The proof is in Appendix .
Theorem1 has shown that linear risk tolerance Is necessary.
The proof of Theorem 2 shows directly that the utility functions
listed above do imply a linear supply of futures, with the same
slope for each farmer. It is then shown that if farmers all have
constant relative risk aversion utility, but differ In their
coefficients of relative risk aversion, then the futures price is
not fully revealing in general.
In summation, the only two families that achieve efficiency





The insight that prices convey information to market
6participants and non-participants alike is an Important one. it
Is clear that, in general, markets cannot be iriformationally
efficient, In the sense that prices convey all of the Information
of the Informed to the uninformed. Still, It Is possible that
prices might convey all of the relevant informatIon, in the sense
that futures prices might be a sufficient statistic for spot
prices.
Although earlier work showed that there were examples In
which price was a sufficient statistic, this paper has used simple
and Intuitive techniques to demonstrate that the parameterlzations
employed In much of this work are indeed special:the constant
absolute risk aversion utility functions, and the constant
relative risk aversion utility functions, with the same
coefficient of relative risk aversion for all traders, are the
only utilIty functions for which efficiency holds generally.
Introducing private information about the demand side further
reduces the likelihood that price can be a sufficient statistic
(Bray [19811).
While the introduction of additional markets nay result In
futures markets conveying more information, the number and kinds
of markets that would have to be introduced to resolve the
problems discussed here cast doubt on the hypothesis that markets
can aggregate and transmit all relevant Information. This paper
can thus be thought of as providing further support for the view
of prices as noisy signals. Under this view, prices convey some,
but not all, of the information possessed by market participants.
For an exposition of that latter view see Grossman and Stiglltz
(1976, 1980) or Kyle (1989).
7APPENDIX A
proof of Theorem 1
A necessary condition for Pf to reveal total output Q =q.
is that Pf be independent of the distribution of Q across farmers.
When facing a price Pf and knowing that the spot price is
distributed as p, farmer i selects his net supply of futures x.
to maximize:
E[LI(pfx. +5(q1_x1))Ipf.q1].
(Henceforth the conditioning on Pf and q. will be suppressed.
The first—order condition is:
o =E[U'(p5q
+(PfP5)X1)(PfP5)1.
By symmetry, if q. =Qfor all i, where Q =Q/m,there will be no
trade on the futures market and hence x. =0for all 1.At the
same time, if Pf is fully revealing, one need only look at the
case with q. =Qto solve for the equilibrium futures price:
Pf =E[U'(pQ)p5]/E{U'(p5Q)1.
Let z. =q.-Q,and let x(z.) be the desired net supply of
futures, given Pf. Now define the function




Since g is merely the sum of the net supplies of futures from each
farmer at the price Pf it must be identically zero if the futures
market is efficient. Differentiating with respect to z1 gives
0 =x'(z.)—x'(—z—z ...—z
1 12 rn—I
8= 1,2,..., rn—i. Hence, for a >2,we have
x'(z1)x'(z2) =x'(-z1—z2...
Moreover,for arbitrary ,thefollowing must also hold:
x' (z1+) x' (z2—i) =x'(z1z2 .—z1)
Thus x' (z) Is a constant function, so x(z) is linear in z.






Since the farmer is a price-taker on the futures market, we say
that he has certain wealth pfq• Linearity of x(') shows that
each farmer accepts a gamble that is linear in certain wealth,
given PfFollowing Stlglltz (1973), utility must be of the
linear risk tolerance class
U' (14)/U" (U) =
forthe futures market to be efficient.
When the above expression is inverted, it can be rewritten
d(log(U'(W)fl/dW =i/a b0.
=(i/b)d(log(a+bwfl/dWb*O.
The first differential equation characterizes the constant
absolute risk aversion class, while the second characterizes the
constant relative risk aversion class, with a translated origin.
Sufficiency is now shown. That is, It is shown thatthe
futures price is fully revealing when all farmers have the same
linear risk tolerance utility. Look first at constant absolute
risk aversion utility:
U(W)
The first—order condition for farmer I is
o= [o[P
+(Pf_s)xi](p_)1
If =0for all i, then the first—order conditions are
9identical. Thus x is linear in and the slope Is the same for
all I.The futures price is clearly equal to
Pf E[es•]/E[es'].
Now consider constant relative risk aversion utility:
U(W) =
Thefirst—order condition for farmer i is
—3 o= (1—)E[(a+ + (PfP5)<1)(Pf P)]
This can be written:
o= + PfX1+
Ifa +
PfX1is a constant multiple of (q.—x.) for all i, then
the first—order conditions are identical for all i.Suppose,
then, that
PfXi =3(q1—x1)
for all i.Summing both terms over I gives
E(+PfX1)
Market clearing implies that a =Q.
The net supply of futures by farmer i is:
x1 =
whichis linear In q1 (for fixed Q). Once again, the slope is the
same for all I. The equilibrium futures price is
Pf =E[(a+Q)S]/E[(+
Thiscompletes the proof of sufficiency.
For m =2,a separate proof of necessity is required. The
method of the proof is to assume that both individuals know Q,
and then to solve for the equilibrium futures price. If Pf Is
fully revealing, for each value of Q there must be a unique Pf
10independent of the distribution of Qbetweenthe two farmers.
As before, let x() denote the net supply of futures, given
the equilibrium futures price Pf. Now let q1 =+ zand let q2 =










The above conditions lmpl' that
x() =x"()
=0.
We now return to the first-order conditions to get




dx._E[UpS(pfpS)] E[U(pf_p9)] —= lPf —2
dq E[U' (PfP5)2I
(-p9) I
fori =1,2; where we have suppressed the argument of U(•) and







It was demonstrated above that a necessary condition for





Substituting for dx1/dq1, the condition at q. =Q/2becomes
0 =2EU"aEU"a2•EU"'a2-EU'a3EU"EU'a
-EU"' EU" a2 EU"
wherea =PfP.
This condition must hold for all possible
distributions for ,Inparticular. we look at the two—point
distribution in which 0 equals A or -A with equal probability.
If the condition above is to hold for all A, it must hold in
a neighborhood of A =0.It is clear, then, tI: all derivatives
must be zoro, when evaluated at A =0.Taking sx (sic)
derivattvos with respect to A, and evaluating at A 0, gives
(U )2U''
u"• [2(U"' )2 -u'.u' - —] = 0.
U,
This is precisely the condition that T =0,where T =—U'/U"Is
the measure of absolute risk tolerance. The condition T" =0
implies
U' (W)/U" 1W) =a+bW.
In these derivations we have made use of the following
formulas:
A.The first—order condition is:
0 =U'((p+A)q)(p+A-pf)
+U'((p5-A)q)•(p9-A-pf),
12where q =Q/2.(Henceforth, let IJ'(A) =U'((+A)q),U'(—A) =
U'((p—A)q), etc.) Differentiating the first—order condition













B.At A0; EUm, EU''2 etc.= 0.
dEa















For constant absolute risk aversion utility, the first—order
condition for farmer I can be written
—S1(q1—x1)p5 o =E[e (PfP5)l.
Satisfying the first—order conditions for all i simultaneously
requires that &(q1—x1) be equated across all farmers.If
k for all J, then
E(qjx.)E (k/.).
j=l j=l
Hencethe supply of futures from farmer I is
x. =
q1 (l/.);
which is linear in q., with the same slope for all I.
For constant relative risk aversion utility, consider first
the case of .S for i =1,2 m.The first-order






If j+PfXj is a constant multiple of (q1—x1) for all I, then the
first-order conditions are identical. Letting .+PfXj =




To solve for ,notethat
14(a1+PfX1) =





Thus= aJQ, wherea =
Forfarmer I, the net supply is:
x =(aq1_aQ)/(PfQ+a);





Itis now shown that the efficiency result d'es not carry
over to the case of farmers who differ in their respective




The first—order condition for farmer i Is now
—5
0 =E[((p5q1 i(p_)]•
There exists a distribution of quantities across farmers such
that there is no trade on the futures market, i.e., x1 0 for i =









E[(p5) I] E[(p5) ]
15Now suppose that p has a two—point distribution, with equal





Thenumerator of f'(5) is not identically zero. Since fS) is not
constant, a fully revealing price cannot exist in general.
It is equally clear that the futures price is not fully
revealing in general if some farmers have constant absolute risk
aversion utility while others have constant relative risk aversion
utility. u
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17ENDNOTES
Thereis an alternative approach to the question of whether
prices are fully revealing, which assumes a finite number of
states of nature and a corresponding finite number of markets. This
approach Is of little economic interest: even limiting ourselves
to an economy in which the only random variables are the outputs
of each of N farms, and if these can take on M different values,
the number of states of nature is MN, far larger than the number
of markets. The most that can be hoped is that prices will be
sufficient statistics for conveying information about the limited
number of aggregate economic variables of interest. For
discussions of this alternative approach, see Green (1977) and
Radner (1979), and the works cited there.
2
Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) and Stiglitz (1971)
present another category of argument against the view that
markets are informationally efficient: if they were, individuals
would have no incentive to obtain information, and thus the only
information which would be reflected in the market is costless
information. The issue is not relevant here since we assume that
each producer can costlessly obtain information concerning his own
output. When Grossman and Stiglltz constructed their model in
which prices perfectly aggregated Information, they were aware of
the specIal role that the assumption of constant absolute risk
aversion played. The present paper grew out of an attempt to show
that the utility functions they employed were almost the only
utility functions which had the property that the dispersion of
crop sizes would have no effect on price.
Inthe earlier studies, Grossman and Stiglitz also discussed
aproblem with the existence of equilibrium.In particular, they
pointed out that if each farmer had perfect information concerning
his own output, and ifthe market perfectly revealed all the
relevantinformation (i.e., provided a perfect predictor of the
futurespot price), then individuals' demand for futures would not
depend on theIrownInformationabout their crop size; but then It
would be Impossible for the futures price to be fully revealing.
This existence problem Is simply an artifact of the assumption
thatfarmers are perfectly informed concerning their own crops,
whichcomprise the only source of uncertainty.
Jordan (1983) addresses the same questions, using markedly
differenttechniques. Not surprisingly, he arrives at similar
answers. The assumptions underlying our analyses are slightly
different, and we arrive at our results using onlyelementary
techniques,which make transparent precisely why the class of
utility functions for which markets are efficient is so
restricted.
18To simplify matters we take as given that utility is concave
In the region of interest. Second order conditions will therefore
not be made explicit.
19